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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Three key states are relevant in considering future nuclear 
proliferation in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, and 
Venezuela.  Argentina and Brazil are critical because of their 
relatively advanced nuclear capabilities.  For historical and 
geopolitical reasons, neither Argentina nor Brazil is likely to 
reactivate nuclear weapons programs.  Venezuela’s 
President, Hugo Chávez, has repeatedly demonstrated 
interest in developing a nuclear program, yet Venezuela 
lacks any serious nuclear expertise.  Even if it had the 
managerial and technological capacity, the lead-time to 
develop an indigenous nuclear program would be measured 
in decades. Acquisition of nuclear technology from 
international sources would be difficult because members of 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group would insist on safeguards, and 
potential non-Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) suppliers are 
highly surveilled, risking the exposure of such a program 
before Venezuela could put a deterrent into place. 
 
While South American states have historically opposed 
nuclear weapons, their acquisition by Brazil and Argentina 
would lead to little more than diplomatic condemnation.  
Brazil and Argentina are both geopolitically satisfied powers 
that are deeply embedded in a regional security community.  
On the other hand, Venezuela under President Chávez is 
perceived as a revisionist power seeking a transformation of 
the international system.  Venezuelan acquisition of nuclear 
weapons would be met with alarm by the United States and 
Colombia, and it would prompt nuclear weapons 
development by Brazil and possibly Argentina, more for 
reasons of preserving regional leadership and prestige than 
for fear of a Venezuelan threat. 
1
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Currently three key actors are relevant in considering future 
nuclear proliferation in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, 
and Venezuela. Argentina and Brazil are critical because of 
their relatively advanced nuclear capabilities.  Argentina has 
successfully exported nuclear technology to four other 
countries, and Brazil is one of only a very small group of 
countries to have mastered and achieved operational 
capability to execute the complete nuclear fuel cycle.
1
  
However, for historical and legal reasons, neither country is 
likely to pursue the development of nuclear explosive 
devices in the foreseeable future. Venezuela lacks any 
capability in the nuclear technology arena, but has declared 
the intention to acquire a civilian nuclear power program.  Its 
president, Hugo Chávez also has repeatedly stated that it 
considers the United States the principal external threat to 
the security of the Bolivarian revolution, which has led some 
outside observers to raise the possibility that Venezuela may 
be interested in more than civilian nuclear power.  On the 
other hand, Venezuela has no operational nuclear reactor or 
any domestic cadre of nuclear scientists with which to 
initiate a program.
2
 
 
However unlikely, this does not mean that states in the 
region would never undertake nuclear proliferation.  There is 
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the possibility, however remote, that dramatic shifts in the 
international system would change the threat perception 
amongst the elites in Argentina and Brazil and lead them to 
pursue weaponization of their nuclear technology.  
Venezuela‟s President, Hugo Chávez, already perceives a 
hostile international system, one in which he believes that 
the leading power, the United States, seeks to overthrow 
him.  Other states with similar threat perceptions – Iran and 
North Korea – followed the path towards nuclear weapons 
systems when their leaders held similar beliefs and sought a 
useful deterrent.   
 
This paper is designed to logically assess the implications of 
an admittedly improbable scenario: that Brazil, Argentina, or 
Venezuela might decide to pursue functional nuclear 
explosive devices coupled to reliable delivery systems.  In 
the event that these States were to acquire such systems, the 
implications for regional relations are mixed.  Brazil and 
Argentina are both territorially and geopolitically satisfied 
powers that are deeply embedded in a regional security 
community.  While South American states have historically 
opposed the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region, 
the acquisition of such weapons by Brazil and Argentina 
would lead to little more than diplomatic condemnation, and 
it would be unlikely to provoke further nuclear proliferation 
in the region.  On the other hand, under the administration of 
President Chávez, Venezuela has become a revisionist power 
in the international system, seeking a multi-polar world in 
which the power of the United States is constrained.  
Venezuelan acquisition of nuclear weapons would be met 
with alarm by the United States and Colombia (its historic 
rival), and it would prompt nuclear weapons development by 
Brazil and possibly Argentina, more for reasons of 
preserving regional leadership and prestige than for fear of a 
Venezuelan threat. 
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THREAT PERCEPTIONS, NUCLEAR INTENTIONS AND 
NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES 
 
Overall, the probability of further nuclear proliferation in 
Latin America is low because the combination of both 
capability and intention to develop nuclear forces is not 
found in any of the possible proliferators. The two countries 
that have the capability to pursue such a program, Argentina 
and Brazil, gave up the pursuit of nuclear weapons two 
decades ago, and they are not likely to resume this path 
given their historical experience and the geopolitical threat 
environment.  Venezuela, whose intentions in the nuclear 
arena are suspected by some, lacks all indigenous capability 
to pursue nuclear weapons development at this time.  Even 
with the assistance of outside powers, the likelihood that it 
could put such a system in place undetected within the next 
ten to twenty years is almost nil.  While Argentina, Brazil 
and Venezuela have been on friendly terms during the past 
decade, there is no indication that they have any interest in 
helping Venezuela obtain nuclear weapons.  Moreover, the 
possibility that non-State actors (such as the private sector or 
organized crime) within Argentina and Brazil might form 
part of such a network without State knowledge, as has been 
detected in the former Soviet Union states and demonstrated 
by the A. Q. Khan network, is lower than in many other 
regions of the world because of two decades of nuclear 
mutual confidence-building and mutual inspection through 
permanent bi-national agency, Agência Brasileiro-Argentina 
de Contabilidade e Côntrole de Materiais Nucleares 
(ABACC).  This agency monitors all nuclear stockpiles and 
facilities in these two countries, and it would be likely to 
detect theft of nuclear technology or materials.  
 
For the foreseeable future, Argentina and Brazil are unlikely 
to resume efforts to acquire nuclear weapons without some 
revolutionary change in the international system that would 
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lead them to perceive an existential threat to the state.  The 
initial rationale for abandoning the pursuit of nuclear 
weapons in Argentina and Brazil was to safeguard 
democracy.  Nuclear development had been heavily 
influenced by the military in both countries, and civilian 
leaders of the newly democratic states stripped the armed 
forces of control of nuclear programs in the 1980s.  These 
programs, some of which had the potential to lead to nuclear 
weapons, had been shrouded in secrecy and were 
unaccountable both under civilian governments and military 
dictatorships.
3
 
  
The developing security community in the Southern Cone, 
taking the form of UNASUR in its latest evolution, means 
that any territorial defense or deterrence rationales for 
nuclear weapons acquisition have faded.  The resolution of 
all territorial disputes between the major regional powers 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile), and ongoing mutual confidence-
building measures, limit the possibility that new conflict 
dynamics will lead States in the region to seek nuclear 
weapons.  Of the two powers with indigenous nuclear 
technology industries, Brazil‟s constitution bans the 
development of nuclear weapons, and both Argentina and 
Brazil are committed to sophisticated nuclear safeguards 
through the ABACC. 
4
 
 
Even though they are unlikely to proliferate, Argentina and 
Brazil are the two countries to watch since they have the 
capability to seek nuclear weapons should their intentions 
change.  During the 2000s, left-center governments with 
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strong nationalist credentials in Argentina and Brazil have 
sought to rekindle their civilian nuclear programs.  There are 
occasional signals in Brazil that indicate that there is a 
constituency among its elites for further nuclear technology 
development with military purposes (a nuclear-powered 
submarine force), if not for nuclear explosive devices.  
During his administration, President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da 
Silva of Brazil spoke of greatly expanding his country‟s use 
of nuclear power, including building new reactors.
5
  Brazil 
has also resisted signing the Additional Protocols of the 
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that would allow more 
thorough International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
inspections.  Given Brazil‟s historical insistence on equality 
and reciprocity in its international relations, it is unlikely to 
sign the Additional Protocols due to the inherently unequal 
treatment that nuclear and non-nuclear weapons powers 
receive under the NPT.    Brazil‟s ongoing struggle with the 
IAEA over the inspection of its enrichment facilities has 
raised eyebrows as well.
6
  Argentina has exported nuclear 
technology four times in its history, and given that it could 
earn more than $500 million from a new sale, the incentive 
to do so again is clear.  In both cases, rising energy costs 
have been used to justify the expansion of civilian nuclear 
power programs.  Another important consideration is that for 
these strongly nationalist governments, nuclear power is a 
symbol of modernity, technological autonomy, and 
sovereignty.
7
  However, this has to be balanced against the 
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reality that the Argentine and Brazilian nuclear programs are 
plagued with cost overruns and delays.  In the Argentine case 
in particular, repeated economic crises during the 1990s and 
2000s have led to a seriously under-resourced nuclear 
program.
8
 
 
Even though it lacks almost any capability to develop 
nuclear technology at this time, assessing Venezuela‟s future 
as a nuclear proliferation risk is difficult because of its 
leader‟s periodic declarations of a desire to develop a nuclear 
power program have not been matched with improving 
capabilities. In the 2005, Venezuela began discussions with 
its MERCOSUR partners, Argentina and Brazil, about 
acquiring nuclear power reactors, although these negotiations 
were unproductive.
9
 Since then, it has sought actively to 
further collaboration with Russia on the development of a 
nuclear energy program, signing a nuclear cooperation 
agreement in 2008. There have also been discussions of 
possible cooperation with Belarus and France in the area of 
nuclear technology.
10
 Perhaps paving the way for its own 
future activities, Venezuela has taken positions on 
proliferation issues that run directly against the mainstream 
of international public opinion, pursuing a highly publicized 
rapprochement with Iran, a potential nuclear supplier, and 
supporting both Iran‟s right to pursue nuclear technology 
without constraints and North Korea‟s periodic missile tests. 
It has also opposed international sanctions over nuclear 
                                                                                                                   
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, 30 
October 2009. 
8
 Logan and Cirino, “Venezuelan Nuclear Technology is a Long Shot,” 
opp. Cit. 
9
 Larry Rohter and Juan Forero, „„Venezuelan Leader Eager to Start 
Nuclear Program,‟‟ The New York Times. November 27 2005, 
www.iht.com/articles/2005/11/27/news/chavez.php_/. 
10
 Víctor Álvarez Riccio, “Venezuela Nuclear: Análisis de Riesgo,” 
October 24, 2010, http://www.analitica.com/especiales/1596346.asp, 
(accessed February 24, 2011). 
8 
 
issues on both powers.
11
  Venezuela‟s stated concern of a 
U.S. invasion has led it to officially orient its Armed Forces 
towards a policy of prolonged popular war and asymmetric 
warfare. This has translated into changes in doctrine and 
educational programs, and the creation of a militia.
12
  
Certainly, nuclear forces would be the ultimate deterrent 
against outside intervention. 
 
Taken together, these factors have led some outside 
observers to claim that Venezuela is a potential nuclear 
proliferation risk.  If we evaluate the contemporary domestic 
and international political context, it seems unlikely.  At the 
international level, Argentina and Brazil have reacted very 
cautiously to the Venezuelan nuclear proposal.  On the one 
hand, they would like the business for economic reasons, but 
on the other they are concerned about Chávez‟s ambitions. 
As members of the NPT and the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSP), Argentina and Brazil are likely to insist on strong 
international safeguards on any nuclear technology sold to 
Caracas.
13
  However, neither the Argentine nor the Brazilian 
governments have opposed Venezuela‟s nuclear ambitions 
publicly, both because they are vulnerable domestically on 
their left flank, where Hugo Chávez has numerous 
sympathizers, and because internationally they still have 
common economic interests with Venezuela. 
 
Other potential suppliers of nuclear technology are also 
problematic for Venezuela. Members of the NSG such as 
France or even Russia are likely to insist on strong oversight 
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of any Venezuelan nuclear program, and the United States 
has conceded that a peaceful civilian nuclear program would 
be unobjectionable if strong safeguards were in place.
14
  
However, given President Chávez‟s nationalist tendencies, 
Venezuela might try to avoid accepting strong oversight and 
seek assistance from non-NSG countries.  Some 
commentators have pointed to Iran and North Korea as 
potential partners for Venezuela, but neither country has a 
track record of successfully exporting its nuclear 
technology.
15
  Also, their programs are among the most 
highly surveilled in the world, increasing the probability that 
any such partnership would be quickly exposed to the 
international community, at great risk to all involved.  
 
On the domestic front, there is no constituency for a nuclear 
program in Venezuela outside of Chávez‟s inner circle.  The 
stated objective of increasing energy resources is not 
credible to most Venezuelans, who see their country as one 
of the richest in oil and hydroelectric energy resources in the 
world.  The Chávez administration has carefully avoided any 
public statements about acquiring nuclear technology as a 
means to deter external aggression, and there is no public 
groundswell in favor of such development, as has occurred 
in Iran.
16
  There are no bureaucratic structures in Venezuela 
that promote the acquisition of nuclear power.  The country‟s 
civilian nuclear research program was dismantled decades 
ago, so there is no scientific constituency advocating such a 
program.  Historically, there has been no constituency within 
the Armed Forces that seeks to acquire nuclear technology 
for military purposes.  As the history of nuclear technology 
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development in Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, and India 
suggests, a constituency inside and outside of government 
favoring nuclear development is a critical element in 
ensuring its continuity, while also realizing that mastering 
the needed technology can take decades.  To succeed, any 
nuclear program would have to extend well beyond the 
tenure of Chávez, even if he wins the 2012 presidential 
elections and his personal health recovers.
17
   
 
Venezuela also lacks the technical or managerial capacity for 
a nuclear technology development program even if Chávez 
or his successors had the political will to pursue it. It is true 
that in the past, Venezuela has maintained sophisticated 
industrial and scientific development programs, especially 
within its oil industry.  However, the 2003 oil industry strike 
and the mass purge of upper- and mid-level employees from 
the industry by the government have greatly reduced the 
managerial and technical talent pool on which the 
Venezuelan government could draw.
18
  The absence of any 
pool of nuclear scientists to contribute to sustaining such a 
program means Caracas would essentially have to start such 
a program from scratch.  It would also require investing in 
educating a cadre of scientists and technology workers.  This 
would lengthen the time horizon to the acquisition of any 
kind of indigenous nuclear program, and would require the 
Chavez administration to change its attitude towards expert 
knowledge.  The decisions made by President Chávez 
repeatedly demonstrate that political criteria trump technical 
competence and bureaucratic autonomy in today‟s 
Venezuela, much to the detriment of many of the programs 
the Venezuelan government has undertaken since 1999.  
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REGIONAL REACTIONS TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
ACQUISITION 
 
Latin America has been a hotbed of liberal international 
institution building, ranging from the Organization of 
American States through various regional economic forums 
and pacts such as the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Latin America (ECLA) and MERCOSUR, and new 
initiatives such as UNASUR and the South American 
Defense Council.  The international regime prohibiting the 
development and acquisition of nuclear weapons in South 
America is particularly robust, resting on the 1967 Treaty of 
Tlatelolco that initiated the process of creating a nuclear 
weapons free zone in the region.
19
  However, there are also a 
number of failed or ineffective international regimes in the 
diplomatic history of the region, and the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons ― however unlikely it seems at present ― 
would represent a „realist shock‟ to the system that would 
undoubtedly cause some regional powers to reconsider their 
adherence to a nuclear weapons-free regime. 
 
Nuclear weapons acquisition by a South American State 
would lead its neighbors to reconsider their own security, 
much as realist or neorealist international relations theory 
describes, and decide whether they should conciliate the new 
nuclear weapons State or balance against it.  Some would 
consider strengthening military and other capabilities or react 
by fostering alliances to balance threats, particularly when 
the State acquiring nuclear weapons is perceived as having 
offensive intentions.
20
  Stephen Walt argues that States do 
not just pay attention to relative capabilities when making 
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calculations of threat, but also the identity and nature of 
other powers, particularly whether their intentions are 
offensive or benign.  When it comes to the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons by Argentina, Brazil or Venezuela, clearly, 
the perceptions of States in the region as to the intentions of 
these countries in acquiring the weapons would play a 
significant part in determining their reactions. 
 
A current thought about international relations in the 
developing world, the so-called „peripheral realism‟, 
suggests that anarchy is not really an accurate description of 
the international system, and it argues that States play 
different roles in the system: order-givers (developed core 
States), order-takers (peripheral States that accept the 
existing international order even though they do not reap the 
same rewards as core States), and order-breakers (peripheral 
States that seek to change the international status quo).  At 
various points in Latin America‟s history, States in the 
region have migrated to the order-breaker category: Cuba in 
1959, Nicaragua in 1979, and Argentina from 1976-1987 (at 
least in terms of missile proliferation).
21
  Order-breaking 
countries, including Venezuela with its long-range 
international objectives, tend to have fraught and conflictive 
relations with order-makers, such as the United States, in the 
international system.  Neither Argentina nor Brazil falls into 
the category of „order-breaking‟ States at this time, and 
Brazil certainly aspires to the status of „order-maker.‟  
 
Of the three States under consideration in this paper, Brazil 
is the least unlikely to acquire nuclear weapons in the next 
two decades since it already has the necessary capability, and 
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at least some members of its political establishment have 
publicly voiced their support for such a move.  On the other 
hand, Brazil is a territorially satisfied power with few border 
disputes of any significance with its neighbors.  It is difficult 
to imagine a geopolitical threat scenario that would lead 
Brazil to acquire nuclear weapons for either defensive or 
offensive purposes.  It is much more powerful militarily than 
any of its neighbors and it is protected by its geography 
―along much of its extensive land border and by South 
America‟s remoteness from other great powers.  Rather, it is 
much more likely that Brazil‟s aspirations to being a modern 
great power and irritation with lack of progress towards 
global nuclear disarmament under the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, would lead it to acquire nuclear 
weapons for symbolic reasons.  Given South America‟s 
status as a nuclear-weapons free zone, Brazil would face a 
regional diplomatic backlash, but it is unlikely that other 
countries in the region would respond by acquiring their own 
nuclear weapons because they perceive Brazil‟s international 
orientation as basically defensive. The Brazilian government 
would likely also face a domestic backlash since its 
constitution forbids the acquisition of nuclear weapons and 
there is little public support for such a step.
22
  
 
The only circumstance under which the Argentine 
government might face some internal pressure to develop a 
nuclear weapons program of its own would be in response to 
a Brazilian decision to acquire such forces.  Here, its latent 
competition with Brazil, concern over Brazilian rearmament, 
and own pursuit of prestige could conceivably prompt a 
reinvigoration of its nuclear programs.  However, the 
profoundly anti-militarist cast of public opinion in 
Argentina, the continuing civilian elite distrust of the 
military, and the prospective cost of the program would 
generally discourage such a move. Under such 
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circumstances, Argentina might simply decide to bandwagon 
with Brazil when it comes to security issues, much as it 
already does, and use the mechanisms in ABACC to achieve 
some level of confidence as to the status of a developing 
Brazilian arsenal. 
 
Any Venezuelan indigenous acquisition of nuclear weapons 
is very far off.  It essentially has no active program at this 
time, and even if Chávez‟s declarations of a joint search for 
uranium with Iranian assistance were true, it would simply 
confirm how preliminary the preparations for a nuclear 
program are in Venezuela.  On the other hand, the 
importation of nuclear technology would be a highly risky 
operation given that the most likely suppliers are also under 
the high degree of intelligence surveillance by interested 
powers. Still, if Venezuela were to acquire a nuclear weapon 
and a delivery system, regional and global reaction would be 
different from that described for the Brazil and Argentina 
cases. Simply put, Venezuela is viewed as a revisionist 
power, an „order-breaker‟, and as such, its intentions would 
not necessarily be viewed as defensive.  There would 
certainly be regional criticism for breaching the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco, although Venezuela‟s allies in the ALBA 
(alliance of countries that support Chávez) would mute it. In 
addition, it is hard to believe that Brazil would ignore such a 
development.  Such an event would be perceived as an 
affront to Brazilian great power status ambitions and 
regional leadership, and this in turn might garner enough 
public opinion and elite support to proceed to rapid 
development of nuclear weapons.  For Argentina, a similar 
logic holds, although widespread anti-militarism and a 
weaker economic base on which to support a nuclear 
weaponization program would discourage follow through.  
Colombia would also be highly concerned, given its historic 
rivalry with Venezuela. Similarly to Venezuela, it lacks any 
indigenous nuclear capability, so in the face of a Venezuelan 
15 
 
nuclear program, it would have to decide whether to seek 
support from outside powers, or simply bandwagon with 
Venezuela by adopting a conciliatory stance. Generally, the 
economic and political advantages for Colombia of being on 
good terms with Venezuela are such that it would require 
quite provocative behavior for the Colombian government to 
try to balance against Venezuelan nuclear power. 
 
The United States would face important choices in any of 
these proliferation scenarios. These States would have 
acquired nuclear weapons in violation of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, and the United States would have to 
decide the degree to which it should mobilize the 
international community to sanction violators.  Given that 
Brazil is perceived as a power with a defensive orientation, a 
consolidated democratic regime, and a growing international 
powerhouse, the United States might simply seek an 
understanding or accommodation that would avoid more 
than symbolic sanctions.  Similar considerations would apply 
in the very unlikely event that Argentina would acquire 
nuclear weapons, although Argentina‟s history of erratic 
foreign policy behavior would lead U.S. policymakers to a 
higher level of concern, and they would also feel less 
constrained about pursuing sanctions given Argentina‟s 
relatively smaller role in the international system compared 
to Brazil.  Venezuelan acquisition of nuclear weapons would 
raise very serious concerns in the United States, not because 
of the prospect that Venezuela would employ such forces 
offensively but because of the deterrent they create. Under 
such a shield, President Chávez might feel more confident in 
pursuing a campaign of petro-diplomacy and covert financial 
and military assistance to friendly governments and political 
movements.  Given President Chávez‟s tendency towards 
bombast, there would certainly be a great deal of drama and 
angst that would feed the public opinion debate in the United 
States over how to approach a newly nuclearized Venezuela, 
16 
 
and this would put U.S. policymakers in an awkward 
position domestically, not just internationally.         
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Argentina and Brazil are likely to remain nuclear technology 
powers and continue to pursue further research in this 
domain.  Nationalist leaders in both countries are interested 
in sustaining their nuclear programs as an economic resource 
and a means to demonstrate sovereignty and technological 
independence.  However, they currently have no interest in 
introducing nuclear weapons into the region, and they are 
likely to continue supporting a reasonable international 
nonproliferation regime.  Given their proven ability to 
develop nuclear technology to a substantial level of 
sophistication, Argentina and Brazil remain potential nuclear 
proliferators because they have capability to move towards 
weaponization in years rather than decades.  
 
In the Venezuelan case, despite the intentions of its 
leadership, there is a low risk for successful nuclear 
proliferation because of strong international and domestic 
constraints. Venezuela lacks any serious domestic nuclear 
development program, and starting and operating such 
programs is expensive and requires a lead-time of decades 
before achieving success.  Given the resources that Chávez 
has at his disposal, a small possibility remains that 
Venezuela could acquire nuclear technology through some 
sort of turnkey arrangement with an existing supplier.  If this 
were to be provided by a member of the NSG, then the 
probability of diversion of this technology for non-peaceful 
purposes is low because of the scarcity of Venezuela‟s 
managerial and technical capacity and absence of nuclear 
expertise. If a non-member of the NSG, which would not 
require international safeguards, provided it, then Venezuela 
and its supplier would face the risk of discovery well before 
17 
 
a fully functional nuclear weapons program could be 
established.  This gap between discovery and the acquisition 
of a deterrent would leave Venezuela highly vulnerable to 
action by the international community. 
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